Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, the Missile Defense Agency has taken crucial steps to integrating the collective efforts of the Department of Defense to provide missile defense. A critical step is acquiring and positively engaging allies in this effort. As the MDA states, -Fielding the missile defense mission requires the combined efforts of the Missile Defense Agency, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Combatant Commanders, the Military Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other federal agencies, more than 17 major defense contractors, the Congress and our allies and friends (emphasis added).‖ Thus, international cooperation for the success of missile defense is essential. Regional efforts to acquire missile defense capabilities can be integrated with U.S. global missile defense priorities and objectives. Of particular note, lately, defense planners have considered the place of the proposed U.S. missile defense capabilities being planned in Poland and the Czech Republic. Should this leg of BMDS be deployed? Should it be integrated into NATO's strategic concept and NATO's emerging missile defense program, or should it be deployed along bilateral lines eschewing a multilateral context? This project will address these questions in addition to two additional concerns. First, it explores the practical implications of deploying components of BMDS with our new NATO ally Poland. Poland initially expressed a willingness to cooperate on ballistic missile defense. Lately, this zeal has cooled and the wisdom of deploying a system in Poland is not immediately obvious. This project will evaluate the strategic value of doing so in light of the project's second objective, the Russian response. Russia's Foreign Ministry has repeatedly warned both Poland and the United States against deploying a U.S. or NATO missile-defense site on Polish territory, saying this action would undermine both security and stability and warning of unspecified measures in response. This project will assess the range of Russia's possible reactions and will conclude with a hypothesis for what Russia's motivations are. In addition, several lesser trumpeted treaties prescribing social conduct proposed much earlier, notably the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 1976, are widely signed into law in Europe but remain ignored by the U.S. If ideology is not driving Europe and the United States apart, another perspective holds that the changing polarity of the international political system is. 2 Without the unified security theme of Soviet containment, the union of West European security will inevitably fragment and revert to a multi-polar state system where powerful incentives for individual foreign policies exist. The inevitable anarchic character of this state system will override any ideological force, be it cooperative or conflictual in nature.
THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT
In foreign policy, the United States has unilaterally used force when member countries of the European Union have often urged restraint in favor of a multilateral institutional response. In addition, a difference in perspective between the United States and Europe is apparent, with Europe favoring longerterm outlooks on problems such as the Middle East. Europe holds that the linchpin to Middle East peace depends on an equitable resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli crisis, whereas the United States has concentrated its efforts on its plan to institute democracy in Iraq. 3 These efforts have been firmly rebuffed by the United Nations Security Council. In many respects, the United States has attempted to capitalize on its unipolar moment and its domineering military capability to use deliberate force to achieve security.
These broadly painted differences as they are typically portrayed, however, obscure the great ideological convergence and shared security interests between the United States and Europe.
Importantly, the United States and the states of Europe are not inextricably on divergent courses driven by the forces of ideology or realpolitik. Their methods of attempting to achieve security surely have diverged, but the basic interests that security policy should serve for both the United States and European states remain more convergent than contradictory. Simply, the differences in worldview between the United States and Europe are often overstated. Clearly U.S. foreign policy diverged from that of many European states in the situations delineated; however, a more nuanced assessment finds differences less in the goals than in the execution of policy to achieve those goals. stemming from insecure energy supplies, the proliferation of WMDs, the rise of China, ethnic conflicts, and various regional crises. Poland is concerned with two main questions: whether the EU and NATO will be able to overcome their internal debates and achieve a level of coordination and complementarity to tackle these challenges, and what role it can play in the process.
NATO has changed its original core responsibility from deterring the Soviet threat against its members, to the post 9/11 era of battling the dangers of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction that 
US-POLISH SECURITY CHALLENGES
From the perspective of the United States, Poland faces three main security issues that will need to be addressed in the near future. The proposed deployment of U.S. missile defense sites on the territory of the Czech Republic and
Poland has also become central to the security debate in the region. Concerns have been voiced that the sites could lead to confrontation with Russia, or make Central Europe a target for rouge states and terrorist attacks. The US believes that the anti-missile defense shield offers an advanced security feature that stretches beyond the recipient countries and offers protection that the whole continent can benefit from. It is the US position that an installation comprised of a radar in the Czech Republic and missile interceptors in Poland does not have the geographic and technical capability to pose any threat to Russia.
The ultimate goal of the project is to deter a potential nuclear threat emanating from the Middle East, and most particularly Iran.
U.S. MISSILE SECURITY PROGRAM
The US has been planning a varying mix of strategic and tactical missile defense programs since the 1980s. After the United States announced that it would withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile The overall cost of the Czech and Polish facilities projected by MDA was to be about USD 3-3.5 billion, of which USD 700-900 million in contracts is planned to go to local firms. The interceptor installations in Poland were estimated to cost about USD 2.5 billion, while the rest of the funds were to be used for the related radar facility in the Czech Republic. This cost, however, does not include additional infrastructure. According to the initial negotiations, there was to be no direct costs to Prague or Warsaw for the construction of the missile defense sites. The construction of the sites was expected to start in 2008 rendering initial capabilities available by 2011 with full operational capability expected by 2013.
THE POLITICAL DEBATE OVER BMD
The US proposal to build radar and missile interceptor sites in Central Europe has sparked an 
WHAT ARE US LONG-TERM INTERESTS WITH POLAND?
Poland will be an important ally for the United States. Poland has become an increasingly more Ideas about what Poland means to Poles in both the European context, the former Soviet sphere of influence and the quest to be a -special‖ alliance partner with the US all explain the Polish government's decision to agree to host a base for ten missile interceptors, the manner in which the government informed their constituents, the reaction to both its NATO partners and Russia and then finally to the Polish people.
Polish foreign policy has historically been driven by internal reaction to external contexts. Realist geopolitics explains a great deal about Polish behavior but it only goes so far and fails to address important variations on questions of Polish national security. Considering the importance of both power and institutions, this paper turns to the constructivist role of self-referential ideas for addressing such key questions. Constructivism bases its analyses on how national actors perceive themselves in a given social context.
REALISM, LIBERALISM, AND CONSTRUCTIVISM
Political realism, the most influential tradition of analyzing foreign policy, focuses on historical patterns and continuity in Poland's foreign policy. Scholars in this tradition often emphasize Poland's national interest as the driving force behind its international behavior. National interest is typically defined in terms of the preservation and enhancement of power within the existing international systeman enduring geopolitical reality rather than something open to gradations or even other interpretations.
Ideology, the nature of government, and political culture matter only in order to specify, but never contradict, the true latent national interest. Similarly, neorealist thinking focuses on the relative level of anarchy in the international system, that the effects of the absence of a legitimate authority are the central force that affects Poland's international behavior. In this case, whether the system is unipolar, bipolar or multipolar primarily drives Poland's foreign policy. Structural realists continue to view power and national interest as the underlying forces, perception and domestic politics are assigned secondary roles and will not vary to the extent that they overrule systemic attributes.
Change or stability for political realists is limited to fluctuations of available power in local contests or to the extent that a change in the international system is affected. In There are two deficiencies with realist and liberal accounts of foreign policy. First, both theories tend to emphasize one aspect of international system at the expense of others. Rather than acknowledging the validity of both power and modernization imperatives in foreign policy formation, they are forced into a false dichotomy. The two approaches, therefore, refrain from developing a comprehensive and complex explanatory framework. In addition, these two approaches assume common cultural lenses and do not pay attention to history and system of self-reinforcing perceptions, that is, they are ethnocentric. Realists commit foreign policy to notions of Western power and dominance while liberals advocate Western economic and political modernization. Developed in the West, by the West, and for the West, these two approaches are increasingly problematic in a world that is multicultural and multimeaningful. In order to address their limitations, both approaches need to be sensitized to social conditions, in which various changes of foreign policy take place. In other words, to understand national foreign policy, the idea of -nation-ness‖ must be explored.
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The perspective that begins the analysis by asking what national is and that exposes the nation to various meanings and interpretations is called social constructivism. The international system is a social phenomenon constructed by actors. In addition to military and institutional constraints emphasized by realism and liberalism, constructivists concentrate on cultural contexts and meanings, in which these actions take place. The international system, from this perspective, is not merely a terrain for applying available military, economic and diplomatic instruments. The international system, rather, is to assist states in their socialization and understanding of interest in world politics. The international environment thereby constructs state actions and interests. This action and interest is not rationally uniform and differ depending individual state experiences with the international system and its components. Particular social contexts define national interests, the formation of such interests should be carefully studied, rather than merely assumed as rational or irrational.
The central dynamic of constructivist theory, therefore, is identity. Before nations figure out how best to defend their interests, they first seek to understand what these interests, in the context of international society, are. In the interaction with other members of international society, nationals develop affiliations, attachments and ultimately their own identity. Historically, some nations emerge as more important than others, it is through these significant -Others‖ that national -Selves‖ define their appropriate character and types of actions. The very existence of the Self becomes difficult without recognition from the Other. National identity therefore is a system of meanings that expresses the Self's emotional, cognitive, and evaluative orientations toward its significant Other. The significant Other establishes the meaningful context for the Self's existence and development and therefore exerts decisive influence on the Self. Through its actions, the Other may reinforce or erode the earlier established sense of national identity. Depending on whether these influences are read by the Self as extending or denying it recognition, they may either encourage or discourage the Self to act cooperatively. 
POLAND'S DOMINANT SCHOOLS OF FOREIGN POLICY THOUGHT
Polish foreign policy is primarily a response to various international contexts while displaying a strong degree of historical continuity. Across ages of monarchy and republicanism, Poland's engagement with the world has followed several persistent patterns of thinking and behavior. As a borderland nation in an uncertain, often volatile external environment, Poland had to continuously respond to similar challenges to its security. These challenges include unrests in neighboring states, threats of external invasion, and difficulties in preserving internal state integrity. In Polish history, three distinct traditions, The main departure of Poland's Foreign Policy was in changes in approach and philosophy rather than in fundamental principles. It was reasoned that their policy should be based on a realistic comprehension of national interests rather than on some abstract ideological criteria. The fact is that
Poland is placed between two great powers and that this strategic location should predominantly dictate its foreign policy. This is a fact that was asserted in 1989 and has been reasserted ever since. As Skubiszewski stated, the new foreign policy should -be based firmly on the fundamentals of external sovereignty and internal independence.‖ 12 In 1990 Mazowiecki was defeated in his bid for president by Lech Walesa, the former unionist head of Solidarity, but then became the prime minister.
Walesa's election cemented a de facto economic and political alliance with the United States and began a series of -warm diplomatic relations‖ that have defined relations to this day. 13 The Polish
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Civilizationist perspective, alive at the end of partition, was simply no longer viable after the end of Soviet occupation. The Civilizationist perspective was supplanted by a fourth way, alignment with the United States, a school that would serve as the center of gravity in Polish politics but certainly not be the ever present dominant equilibrium. Walesa's Presidential administration was described as one of -war at the top‖ given the degree of bureaucratic infighting within the Polish government. The Sejm did go through several changes in leadership, five different prime ministers during Walesa's tenure. Despite this amount of domestic turnover, the department of foreign affairs remained remarkably stable.
Skubiszewski would serve through the end of the Suchocka regime in October 1993, and only after plotting a course that would bring Poland stability and dictating a course that would be followed by subsequent Foreign Ministers of State.
Polish Foreign Policy initially had three prime elements: the protection of national independence, trans-border cooperation and regional cooperation. 14 All governments have this goal, but Poland is especially sensitive to defending national independence due to Soviet subjugation for over forty years and near annihilation by the Germans before that. The emphasis on independence also serves national interests by -facilitating internal political and economic changes.‖ 15 The specific manifestation of this policy has been the unremitting efforts to develop and maintain friendly relations with Poland's most powerful neighbors Germany and Russia. Also along this end Poland has sought rapprochement with the west, particularly Western Europe. Skubiszewski said, -We shall seek to anchor our independence in the broad framework of European security as well as in multilateral and integrative forms of international cooperation.‖ The cooperation he wanted came from the west.
The second major consideration of Polish Foreign policy was that of geopolitical imperatives which dictate the focus of Poland's regional involvement. Regional cooperation is imperative in light of past mistakes. Poland's relations with Czechoslovakia in the 1920's and 1930's were strained by ethnic and territorial conflicts. They had enormous political differences with Hungary. In effect, they became an island in a sea of indifference and it hurt them. Without regional solidarity, it was all the easier to conquer. Good relations with neighboring countries are sought today for security and economic well being. Also of great importance is the need to stabilize the potentially volatile political situation in Eastern Europe. It is hypothesized that a stable Central Europe will stabilize the political situations with the former Soviet States. In theory, regional cooperation will lead to a larger -new European order required among countries to preclude the economic or political isolation of any one country and attempts by one country to dominate others.‖ 
POLISH FOREIGN POLICY TRADE
Where does this leave us? Poland will be an important ally for the United States. Poland really has no better strategic option. The US should allow Poland the appearance of looking independent, this costs very little. The US should act like a good big brother and empower Poland and stop squandering good will. If we consider missile capability from Iran as being imminent, we ought to push for deployment of BMDS in Central Europe. If it is not a pressing issue, we should allow the respective domestic forces to suspend deployment and re-engage through NATO in a multilateral setting.
What can the US do to strengthen ties to Poland? There actually are very simple steps that would go a very long way. The extension of the U.S. Visa Waiver Program to include the new EU members in CEE will be an effective way to preserve and develop this valuable partnership. More scientific exchanges and increased educational and training opportunities would strongly consolidate the relationship. The U.S. administration is striving to widen these programs, while cooperating with Warsaw to improve their security and border protection. With regard to economic ties, the EU is the largest trading partner for the U.S. and Poland is becoming an increasingly significant part of the trillion dollar transatlantic trade. Billions in trade and investment between U.S. and Poland has been registered during the last year. Economic growth, foreign investment, and joint ventures are a sign of growing confidence in Poland by U.S. business.
Finally, one of the most important issues in the U.S.-Poland agenda should be the emergence of Russia as an international power aiming to reestablish its political influences in the region. Energy issues are a common priority for the U.S., Poland, and the EU as they have serious implications for Transatlantic security. The U.S. needs to take a more proactive role and work with European capitals to ensure the 18 diversification of energy sources, the management of energy demands, and transparency in energy negotiations. In sum, developments in Central Europe demand greater attention in Washington. As new EU members, CEE states are seeking to eliminate any lingering divisions in Europe and the U.S. can benefit from a strong and unified continent.
The recent arms transfer negotiated by new Defense Minister Sikorski has gone a long way to securing Poland's continued allegiance. Poland's Air Defense needs improvement and their army needs serious airlift capacity. More exercises will integrate joint capacity. Poland continues to ask for access to more intelligence (on the order of the US-UK intelligence sharing), this will have to wait, but not forever.
